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Abstract 
This paper argues that knowledge sharing can be conceptualized as different 
situations of exchange in which individuals relate to each other in different ways, 
involving different rules, norms and traditions of reciprocity regulating the 
exchange. The main challenge for facilitating knowledge sharing is to ensure that 
the exchange is seen as equitable for the parties involved, and by viewing the 
problems of knowledge sharing as motivational problems situated in different 
organizational settings, the paper explores how knowledge exchange can be 
conceptualized as going on in four distinct situations of exchange denominated 
organizational exchange yielding extrinsic rewards, organizational exchange 
yielding intrinsic rewards, financial exchange, and social exchange. The paper 
argues that each situation of exchange has distinct assumptions about individual 
behaviour and the intermediaries regulating the exchange, and facilitating 
knowledge sharing should therefore be viewed as a continuum of practices under 
the influence of opportunistic behaviour, obedience or organizational citizenship 
behaviour.  
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Introduction 
A key task for organizations is to mobilize knowledge (Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000). Facilitating knowledge sharing can lead to increased innovative 
performance, and reduce the resources spent on fire fighting (Bohn, 2000). But 
knowledge sharing does not come easy – individual’s willingness to engage in 
knowledge sharing is a central barrier for sustainable knowledge sharing activities, 
and in recent years, the number of articles, books and seminars analysing how to 
overcome these barriers have exploded, yet how to overcome them still remain 
quite ambiguous.  
Knowledge sharing is facilitated by the working of incentives, meaning that 
extra incentives increase - whilst extra costs reduce - a particular type of 
knowledge sharing behaviour (Cabrera and Cabrera 2002; Lindenberg, 2001, p. 
317). A pivotal part of knowledge sharing research is therefore about identifying 
what kind of incentives can be applied to increase individual’s willingness to 
share knowledge. Incentives can be both financial and non-financial rewards, but 
a burgeoning amount of research stresses that non financial rewards are far more 
important than financial rewards (Osterloh and Frey, 2000, Simon, 1991). 
Consequently, recent research on knowledge sharing seems to be biased towards 
the preference of non financial rewards such as pleasure in performing one’s job 
or increased organizational efficacy. Some researchers do, however, emphasize 
financial rewards as an important means to facilitating knowledge sharing (Foss, 
2003; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), but the dominating logic in the research on 
knowledge sharing is that even though knowledge might be considered as 
yielding power, and even though individuals seem to be self-interest seeking, 
knowledge sharing can definitely be facilitated by non financial rewards.  
This apparently self-contradictory logic has resulted in a rather narrow-minded 
discussion of knowledge sharing: The economy of knowledge sharing is either 
dominated by a rational cost-benefit analysis based on opportunistic behaviour 
and is thereby similar to more traditional economies of tangible resources. Or, 
the economy of knowledge sharing is viewed in a social-exchange perspective 
assuming altruistic behaviour and thereby distinguishing it from a traditional 
organization economy perspective. I argue that both perspectives are plausible, 
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but instead of considering them as mutually exclusive I suggest that knowledge 
sharing should be viewed as a continuum of different models of exchanges each 
yielding different conditions for facilitating knowledge sharing. 
Following Ouchi (1980, p. 130) I argue that knowledge sharing is an 
interdependent process involving an exchange in which the individual gives 
something of value and receives something of value. What the individual gives or 
receives is part of the workings of incentives, but as Fiske (1991) has argued 
different types of exchanges involve different types of reciprocities.  
Consequently, I establish a conceptual framework encompassing four different 
types of knowledge exchange, and each exchange represents distinct 
organizational settings facilitating or hindering knowledge sharing. Facilitating 
knowledge sharing is hence about organizing exchanges through different 
institutional arrangements (Jones, 1983, p. 455). 
The paper begins by examining the field of knowledge sharing and knowledge 
sharing barriers. This is followed by an analysis of knowledge sharing as being an 
exchange, where a central challenge is to understand what kind of reciprocities 
are at stake. Then follows an analysis of how intrinsic and extrinsic rewards 
facilitate knowledge sharing, and, eventually, it is being analyzed how knowledge 
sharing can be viewed as comprising different types of organizational settings, 
and how knowledge sharing therefore is to be facilitated by applying different 
types of incentives.  
 
The field of knowledge sharing 
The concept of knowledge sharing has been buzzing around for quit some time. 
Rhetorically, the concept has gained an enormous interest, and both academics 
and practitioners are eager to identify, understand and explore the challenges of 
facilitating knowledge sharing. As Rigby (2001) and Lucier and Torsilieri (2001), 
however, has emphasized, it is rather difficult to document any positive results of 
applying knowledge sharing tools and philosophies.  
But the quest for exploring what problems knowledge sharing entails, why 
problems arise and how to address them continue, because even though we are 
unable to relate positive organizational performance to knowledge sharing 
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activities, we do believe that knowledge sharing can positively influence 
organizational performance.  
The goal of knowledge sharing can be conceptualized as a continuum ranging 
from the exploration of new knowledge through renewed combination of 
existing knowledge (Appleyard 1996, Hargadon 2003, Uzzi and Lancaster 2003) 
to exploitation of existing knowledge (Grant 1996, Szulanski 1996). In other 
words, the goal of knowledge sharing can be to either explore new knowledge or 
exploit existing knowledge, which is a somewhat analytical distinction wherefore 
practice will often entail part of both processes (March 1991). 
The exploration of new knowledge has a more innovative focus than the 
exploitation of knowledge, and the perspective is grounded and exposed in the 
literature that has a primary focus on innovation such as Hargadon (2003) and 
Sutton (2002). On the other hand, the literature on exploitation of knowledge is 
more concerned with how to mobilize organizational best practices enabling a 
more efficient application of both individual and organizational knowledge. 
Knowledge sharing goes on both in and across organizational boundaries, and 
involves different organizational settings such as supplier relations (Takeishi, 
2002), customer support (Davenport and Klahr, 1998), informal inter-firm 
relations (Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003), communities of practices (Brown and 
Duguid, 2001), and product development teams (Hansen, 2002). 
In this article, knowledge sharing will, however, be limited to the process of 
intra-organizational exploration of knowledge, and the process is subsequently 
defined as being about identifying existing and accessible knowledge, in order to 
transfer and apply this knowledge to solve specific tasks better, faster and 
cheaper than they would otherwise have been solved 
 
Knowledge sharing barriers 
Some of the barriers for knowledge sharing are believed to be opportunistic 
behavior (Nicherson and Zenger, 2004), lack of trust between knowledge senders 
and receivers (Abrahms et al., 2003; Borgatti and Cross, 2003), no knowledge of 
where knowledge is located (O’Dell and Grayson, 1998) and the 
epistemologically different faces of tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995; Szulanski, 2003). Consequently, the enhancers for knowledge 
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sharing are believed to be the creation of a knowledge sharing culture 
(Davenport, DeLong and Beers, 1999), increased organizational efficacy (Cabrera 
and Cabrera, 2000) and the introduction of knowledge brokers establishing a link 
between senders and receivers of knowledge – to mention just a few.  
As Pfeffer (1997, p. 25) has emphasized “perhaps the most fundamental 
question addressed by organization studies is how we are to understand what 
causes behaviour”, and the reason for wanting to understand what causes 
behaviour is to being able to create and control a causal relation between certain 
social processes and a desired outcome such as improved knowledge sharing. To 
become better at facilitating knowledge sharing, we must therefore address the 
fundamental problems that cause knowledge sharing to fail – these fundamental 
problems are caused by the combination of not being able or willing to share 
knowledge, giving rise to three separate – yet interdependent – explanations for 
the failure of intra-organizational knowledge sharing.  
The first focuses on the social structure in which knowledge sharing is 
embedded. The social structure can be characterized as a principal-agent situation 
in which the principal and agent might have opposing interests leading to social 
dilemmas defined as “collective situations in which egoistic incentives yield 
individually dominating strategies that converge on deficient equilibria – that is, 
on outcomes that are less preferred by the choosers than are alternative 
outcomes” (Dawes, 1991, p. 17).  
So, social dilemmas exist when individual self-interest leads to inefficient 
organizational outcomes (Miller, 1992, p. 36), and they encompass “dilemmas of 
the common good” and “the public good dilemma” (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). 
A prerequisite for social dilemmas is, hence, that individuals tend to prefer 
egoistic incentives to the common good. In other words, individual’s behaviour 
is often anticipated to be self-interest seeking or opportunistic (Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996). 
As a growing body of literature, however, has emphasized, individuals are not 
per se opportunistic – they do also behave as good soldiers (Organ, 1998), or as 
Doeringer (1991, p. 110) put it in a study of large companies: “The assumption 
that employees prefer shirking to working seems largely to be discredited in the 
modern management strategies of large enterprises”. Whether social dilemmas 
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arise is then a matter of whether behaviour is dominated by opportunism or 
benevolence.  
The other explanation for knowledge sharing barriers relates to the different 
faces of knowledge.  When it comes to what knowledge is actually being shared, 
there are endless discussions as to what form knowledge can take, or where 
knowledge exists – knowledge can be both organizational knowledge, tacit 
knowledge, explicit knowledge and so on and so forth. Following this, knowledge 
exists at various places such as in the individual, in organizational routines, 
written down in formal guidelines, or in one part of the organization – to 
mention just a few existences of knowledge. Barriers for sharing knowledge can 
therefore arise from both cognitive dimensions of knowledge and the 
epistemologically different faces of knowledge (Hinds and Pfeffer, 2003; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995). 
Finally, the third explanation for knowledge sharing barriers focuses on 
structural dimensions such as not knowing where knowledge resides or not 
having the time to share knowledge. The barriers for knowledge sharing are in 
these instances not caused by ignorance, but rather by not being aware of 
possible knowledge repositories or not being able to exploit knowledge 
repositories (Cross and Parker, 2004, p. 36). In other words, these barriers are 
not caused by opportunistic behaviour, but as a consequence of the organization 
not paying sufficient attention to how different faces of knowledge are supported 
by, for instance, open spaces, easily structured databases, and social events 
fostering a trust-building community.  
The barriers for knowledge sharing can, hence, be related to dimensions of i) 
the social structure, ii) the epistemological different faces of knowledge and iii) 
structural misfit between the willingness and ability to share knowledge. The 
dominating explanations for why these barriers arise are i) opportunistic and self-
interest seeking behaviour, ii) cognitive barriers making it impossible to 
communicate tacit knowledge and iii) no awareness – as opposed to ignorance – 
of knowledge, and no opportunities to enact the willingness to share knowledge. 
In the remainder I will focus on the barriers caused by social dilemmas, and 
the purpose is to emphasize that knowledge sharing barriers encompass different 
dimension of social dilemmas that relate to different assumptions about human 
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behaviour, and that leads to different organizational settings in which knowledge 
sharing can take place (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). 
 
Knowledge sharing as an exchange 
Much of contemporary writings on knowledge sharing have mistakenly 
anticipated knowledge sharing to be a linear process where knowledge flows 
from a sender to a receiver. The so-called SRMC model – encompassing a 
sender, receiver, message and context - has to a considerable degree influenced 
the analysis of barriers and enhancers. The model originates from information 
theory, which purpose is purely quantitative and more specifically related to 
identifying “the amount of information associated with, or generated by, the 
occurrence of an event with the reduction in uncertainty, the elimination of 
possibilities, represented by that event or state of affairs” (Dretske, 1981, p. 4).  
The SRMC model is, hence, a linear model intended to quantify the 
consequences (i.e., quantify the information needed to reduce uncertainty at the 
receiver) when information flows from a sender to a receiver. Applying this 
model to knowledge sharing processes may, therefore, be problematic. First – 
and foremost – because the model implies a flow perspective assuming 
knowledge, more or less troublesome, moves from a sender to a receiver. 
Apparently, the flow does not entail a flow the other way around – or, in other 
words, the flow comes without obligations. The SRMC model focuses the 
discussions of knowledge sharing processes to problems related to either giving 
away knowledge, or receiving knowledge. This is, however, only part of the story. 
Knowledge sharing is at one and the same time about giving and receiving. 
Therefore rather than viewing knowledge sharing as a flow, the process must be 
viewed as an exchange balancing the giving and receiving.  
Following the arguments of sociologist Georg Simmel every interaction 
between human beings can be seen as an exchange. A challenge in viewing 
human interaction as situations of exchange is to identify what is being 
exchanged, and how the exchanges are created, evolved and sustained. In other 
words, there are several dimensions of an exchange leading to different models 
of exchange, as was also emphasized by Simmel: 
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All contacts among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the 
equivalence. The equivalence of innumerable gifts and performances can be 
enforced. In all economic exchanges in legal form, in all fixed agreements 
concerning a given service, in all obligations of legalized relations, the legal 
constitution enforces and guarantees the reciprocity of service and return 
service-social equilibrium and cohesion do not exist without it. But there are 
also innumerable other relations to which the legal form does not apply, and 
in which the enforcement of the equivalence is out of the question. Here 
gratitude appears as a supplement. It establishes the bond of interaction, of 
the reciprocity of service and return service, even when they are not 
guaranteed by external coercion (Simmel quoted in Blau, 1964, p. 1). 
 
As argued by Boer, van Baalen and Kumar (2004), Ferrary (2003), Fiske (1991), 
Ouchi (1980) and Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) different models of exchange exist 
characterizing different processes by which conformity to knowledge sharing is 
achieved (Homans, 1951, p. 281).  
Since individuals relate to each other in different ways, different norms of 
reciprocity will be at stake in different types of exchange (Fiske, 1991; Ouchi, 
1980). The motivation for transferring knowledge is in other words the 
expectation to receive something in return, and what is being received in return – 
and when and how it is being returned – depends on the model of exchange. 
Knowledge sharing is, hence, the process of exchanging knowledge for an 
obligation to reciprocate something such as knowledge, monetary rewards or 
gratitude. 
I distinguish between three models of exchange comprising different kinds of 
return. Following the analysis of Ouchi (1980) I distinguish between three 
different models of exchange denominated financial exchange, organizational 
exchange and social exchange. The models represent the organizational setting, 
social understanding or culture (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983) encompassing the 
norms, traditions and rules governing the exchange so that it is being “seen as 
equitable by the parties involved” (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983, p. 470).  
In financial exchanges the sender of knowledge is being compensated by 
monetary rewards. These kinds of exchanges are quite similar to transactions on 
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the free market – a lot of contracting is necessary to avoid opportunism and self-
seeking behaviour. As a consequence a lot of monitoring takes place – it is 
necessary to monitor whether knowledge is actually being shared, and – hence – 
whether the terms of the contract are fulfilled, so that the sender of knowledge 
can be rewarded accordingly. Governing financial exchanges can therefore, as 
argued by Nickerson and Zenger (2004, p. 624), be rather cumbersome and 
costly. A similar point is emphasized by Ouchi (1979) who has stressed, that the 
risk of the market is that the costs of contracting and monitoring eventually 
cause the market to fail, or in the words of Ouchi (1979, p. 838): 
 
In a market mechanism, the costs of carrying out transactions between 
parties have mostly to do with assuring one-self that the other party is 
dealing honestly, since all information relevant for the substance of the 
decision is contained in prices and is therefore not problematic. If honesty 
cannot be taken for granted, however, then each party must take on the 
cripplingly high costs of surveillance, complete contracting, and 
enforcement in order not to be cheated. 
 
In financial exchanges the price of knowledge is transparent, and the parties 
involved in the exchange are free to accept or reject the terms of the contract. 
Financial exchanges are similar to the market mode of control in Ouchi’s (1980) 
framework, where the intermediary in the exchange is the price of knowledge.  
Organizational exchanges take place within organizational boundaries, and 
senders of knowledge are compensated either formally or informally. Formal 
compensation is quite similar to financial exchanges – except that they are 
embedded within organizations. Formal compensations often take the form of 
promotions or bonuses (Foss and Mahnke, 2003, p. 89), or just simply that 
individuals keep their job – and hence their salary. In other words, formal 
compensations are based on formal requirements to individual’s organisational 
behaviour, and if individuals do not comply with these requirements they will – 
eventually – be excluded from the organization. Organizational exchanges do 
also focus on more informal compensations such as being nominated as 
“employee of the month” or otherwise become known as an extraordinary 
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contributor to organizational performance. Organizational exchanges are similar 
to Ouchi’s (1980) bureaucracy mode of control, where rules are the central 
intermediary between the sender and receiver of knowledge.  
Social exchanges are characterized by being more informal exchanges based on 
personal commitment and relations. An important difference between social 
exchanges and financial exchanges (and the same difference can be observed 
between formal and informal compensations in organizational exchanges) is that 
social exchanges come with unspecified obligations (Blau, 1964, p. 93). This 
means that prior to the exchange no resources are spent on contracting such as 
stipulating what knowledge is to be shared when, and how this is going to be 
rewarded. Social exchanges are regulated through traditions established in social 
relations such as clans and communities (Brown and Duguid, 2001; Ouchi, 1980). 
Each of the exchanges touches upon different assumptions as to why 
individuals share knowledge ranging from opportunistic behaviour and 
obedience to sheer organizational citizenship behaviour or altruism. Financial 
and organizational exchanges are dominated by economic man logic assuming 
that opportunism and self-interest seeking behaviour are dominant barriers for 
collaboration. Social exchanges – on the other hand – focus on generosity, trust 
and some degree of organizational citizenship behaviour as pivotal for how, and 
why, individuals interact.  
How to balance the giving and receiving depends on whether knowledge 
sharing is conceptualized as a financial, organizational or social exchange, 
because in each of the three models of exchange different intermediaries and 
behavioural assumptions are at stake. Table I lists the central characteristic of the 
three models of exchange.  
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Conceptualizing knowledge sharing in relation to different organizational 
settings, intermediaries and behavioural assumptions allows for different 
incentives to facilitate knowledge sharing. The clan control – as emphasized by 
Ouchi (1980) - as an important governance mechanism in social exchanges 
consists of different incentives compared to governance mechanisms such as 
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conformity to organizational rules or the price in financial exchange. Likewise, 
the incentives at work in different models of knowledge exchange, tell something 
about how to facilitate knowledge sharing, and before discussing how different 
organizational settings apply different types of incentives, the next section 
focuses on how different types of incentives relate to knowledge sharing.  
 
Facilitating knowledge sharing 
Focusing on elements in the social structure of organizations as the main cause 
for knowledge sharing barriers – and, hence, leaving aside the epistemological 
different faces of knowledge and structural dimensions of not being able to share 
knowledge – is off course somewhat simplistic. In the following I will, however, 
for the sake of the argument and subsequent analysis, view the process of 
facilitating knowledge sharing as a motivational problem, where the challenge is 
to identify what motivational patterns can be used to facilitate knowledge sharing 
(Katz, 1964).  
Organizations are social structures comprising different institutional 
arrangements developed to regulate exchanges (Jones, 1983, p. 455). When 
individuals enter these social structures social dilemmas caused by for instance 
opportunistic behaviour may arise, and to minimize the social dilemmas and 
adjust individual’s behaviour to organizational behaviour, incentives are applied.  
Incentives are instrumental in that they motivate individuals to engage in 
certain organizational work that they would otherwise not have engaged in. In 
other words, people will be motivated to engage in knowledge sharing if they 
receive something in return for the knowledge they share. What they expect to 
receive in return does, however, depend on by which model of exchange the 
receiving and returning is regulated.  
Overcoming social dilemmas stemming from opportunistic or self-interest 
seeking behaviour is the most often discussed challenge of facilitating knowledge 
sharing (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). Opportunism is believed to be a basic 
premise for individual behaviour leading to knowledge hoarding, or in the words 
of Nickerson and Zenger (2004, p. 622): 
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Opportunism in knowledge exchange discourages actors from sharing 
knowledge, and knowledge is therefore not placed in the hands of those 
who will find it of most value. Instead, self-interest encourages actors to 
hoard knowledge and embed it into saleable products. 
 
A recent body of literature has, however, focused more on the assumption that 
opportunistic behaviour in knowledge sharing activities only exists to a minor 
degree, and that individuals are far more willing to share knowledge than often 
anticipated (Adler, 2001; Boer, van Baalen and Kumar, 2004, Cross and Parker, 
2004, Ferrary, 2003) Their behaviour is apparently more altruistic than 
opportunistic.  
In knowledge sharing dominated by altruism one would expect less knowledge 
shirking and more knowledge sharing compared to situations of exchange 
dominated by opportunism, which may lead to the wrong conclusion that 
facilitating knowledge sharing becomes easier. Facilitating knowledge sharing 
does not become easier, but how to facilitate the process changes because the 
incentives at work are different in situations of exchange dominated either by 
opportunism compared to altruism.  
The term altruism may, however, be misleading since it often evokes an image 
of the good soldier being willing to cooperate or sharing knowledge without any 
obligations (cf. Podsakoff et al., 2000). But as emphasized by Mauss (1954) gift-
exchanges involve counter-gifts, and it may therefore be argued that within social 
exchange theory pure altruism does not exist. Social exchange theorists including 
Mauss (1954), Homans (1961), Blau (1964) and Ekeh (1974) have for years 
discussed whether pure altruism at all exists. Blau (1964) talks about what he 
denominates “an apparent altruism” emphasizing an escape from self-interest 
seeking behaviour, but still with a strong emphasis on reciprocation, or as Blau 
(1964, p. 17) puts it: 
 
An apparent “altruism” pervades social life; people are anxious to benefit 
one another and to reciprocate for the benefits they receive. But beneath 
this seemingly selflessness an underlying “egoism” can be discovered; the 
tendency to help others is frequently motivated by the expectation that 
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doing so will bring social rewards. Beyond this self-interested concern with 
profiting from social associations, however, there is again an “altruistic” 
element or, at least, one that removes social transactions from simple 
egoism or psychological hedonism. A basic reward people seek in their 
associations is social approval, and selfish disregard for others makes it 
impossible to obtain this important reward.  
 
Apparently, then, the willingness to engage in knowledge sharing is a continuum 
ranging from “apparent altruism” regulated through social control to “egoism” 
or opportunistic behaviour regulated by management authority. 
Knowledge sharing barriers can then be overcome by focusing on incentives 
encompassing elements of social control or management authority. This is partly 
reflected in the literature on knowledge sharing, but the tendency has been to 
focus on either social control mechanisms or management authority.  
Incentives facilitating knowledge sharing has, however, to encompass the 
continuum ranging from apparent altruism to opportunistic behaviour, since the 
continuum represents different situations of exchange alluding to different types 
of incentives at work, and all are present in different settings of organizational 
work.  
Since knowledge sharing represents different models of exchange, the sharing 
of knowledge involves giving away knowledge and receiving something in return. 
The balance is delicate because knowledge is simply not giving away for free or 
for that matter for knowledge – the sharing of knowledge is to be balanced by 
returning some type of reward such as money, bonus, organizational efficacy, 
promotion, social acceptance, and informal acknowledgments – or, in the words 
of Ouchi (1980, p. 138) “a norm of reciprocity underlies all exchange 
mechanisms”, meaning that the sustainable sharing of knowledge can be 
explained as the fulfilled expectations of receiving some incentives in return.  
Conceptually, incentives take on two forms – intrinsic or extrinsic, and being 
intrinsic motivated is believed to be more ideal than being extrinsic motivated 
(Osterloh and Frey, 2000). One of the most important differences between 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards is that in performing certain organizational 
activities one will often perceive them as yielding intrinsic rewards when they are 
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not just instrumental, but also pleasurable in their own right (Ciulla, 2000, p. 17). 
The reason for this is that intrinsic motivation does not involve any actions 
forced by command (Lindenberg, 2001, p. 319) – and intrinsic rewarding 
activities can therefore be seen as situations in which the gap between individual 
behaviour and organizational expectations to individual behaviour has been 
reduced.  
But intrinsic rewards are not solely enjoyable and stimulating, they also 
encompass social acceptance and status, or as Lindenberg (2001, p. 332) puts it:  
 
Activities are performed the longer without any tangible reward the more 
they are enjoyable, that is the more they are simultaneously (i) stimulating, 
(ii) providing comfort (absence of pressure from others), (iii) providing 
behavioural confirmation by self, (iv) providing behavioural confirmation by 
others, (v) providing status, (vi) allowing improvement of non-tangible 
resources (such as skills and competencies) without reduction in any of the 
other functions. 
 
That means that being intrinsically rewarded can be both about formal 
acknowledgment providing for instance status and increasing efficacy (Cabreara 
and Cabrera, 2002, p. 698), and more informal acknowledgement such as 
increased social status due to the willingness to help colleagues solve their work. 
In other words, sometimes individuals will find it rewarding in itself to help 
others. In the words of American sociologist, Peter M. Blau, we are competent 
helpers that find it enjoyable to help:  
 
Favours make us grateful, and our expressions of gratitude are social 
rewards that tend to make doing favours enjoyable, particularly if we 
express our appreciation and indebtedness publicly and thereby help 
establish a person’s reputation as a generous and competent helper (Blau, 
1964, p. 16) 
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These social rewards are exactly the kind of powerful motivation that Simon 
(1991) stressed as the far more important kind of rewards compared to extrinsic 
rewards governed through control and authority:  
 
Although economic rewards play an important part in securing adherence to 
organizational goals and management authority, they are limited in their 
effectiveness. Organizations would be far less effective systems than they 
actually are if such rewards were the only means, or even the principal 
means, of motivation available. In fact, observation of behaviour in 
organizations reveals other powerful motivations that induce employees to 
accept organizational goals and authority as bases for their actions (Simon, 
1991, p. 34). 
 
So there is reason to believe that intrinsic rewards actually exist, and the challenge 
for fostering and improving knowledge sharing is to become better at supporting 
situations yielding intrinsic rewards such as the social rewards emphasized by 
Blau (1964). 
Being a competent helper – or for that matter assuming organizational 
citizenship behaviour – is clearly distinct from assumptions embedded in 
economic man logic, where individuals are assumed to be self-interest seeking 
and opportunistic causing social dilemmas and organizational problems such as 
shirking. Problems caused by economic man logic can only be solved by either 
offering an increased reward, or demanding a lower individual effort. Monetary 
rewards such as increased salary and bonus are extrinsic incentives compensating 
the sender of knowledge, and hence balancing the exchange of giving and 
receiving.  
The main differences between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are related to 
transparency, the cost of contracting and control, and unspecified obligations. 
Extrinsic rewards are far more transparent than intrinsic rewards in as such that 
they are more tangible, and therefore manageable. The transparency does, 
however, assume a great deal of contracting and control, to make sure that the 
incentives actually produce the behaviour agreed upon. Situations yielding 
intrinsic rewards are less transparent since intrinsic incentives by nature are non-
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tangible, and balancing the giving away knowledge and receiving intrinsic 
rewards, are based on unspecified obligations. Trust replaces the cost of 
contracting, but trust does not come easy – organizations do also incur costs in 
building up trust-based relations (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983, p. 478), but the cost 
is less controllable and predictable compared to situations based on extrinsic 
rewards.  
The norm of reciprocity underlying the process of knowledge sharing is, 
hence, a question of giving something in return for the knowledge being shared. 
What is being giving in return can take the form of either extrinsic or intrinsic 
rewards, or a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.  
How knowledge sharing is being rewarded depend on what has been termed 
the culture, organizational setting or social understanding (Alvesson, 2004; Jones, 
1983; Malone, 2004, Robertson and Swan, 2003) in which knowledge sharing 
takes place, and as argued by Blau and Scott (1962) organizations consist of many 
different – formal and informal – structures with distinct ways of balancing the 
giving and receiving. How to best facilitate knowledge sharing is therefore 
dependent on in which model of exchange knowledge sharing goes on, and in 
the next section I argue that knowledge sharing can be viewed as a process going 
on in at least four different organizational settings. 
 
Organizational structures facilitating knowledge sharing 
Organizations comprise different types of structures such as formal departments, 
project teams, communities of practices and informal networks. Each structure 
has its own characteristics relating to what is the purpose of the structure, who 
belongs to the structure and what holds the structure together (Wenger, 
McDermott and Snyder, 2002, p. 42)? 
In the same manner, knowledge sharing can be conceptualized as different 
situations of exchange facilitated through different types of organizational 
structures. In the following I explore four types of organizational structures 
characterized by yielding extrinsic or intrinsic rewards and whether the rewards 
are what Katz (1964) denominates system or individual rewards. 
System rewards are incentives potentially available for all organizational 
member and they are intended at maintaining an acceptable level of knowledge 
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sharing activities (Katz, 1964, p. 138). System rewards can be extrinsic such as 
salary, promotion or bonus payment, or intrinsic such as increased efficacy or 
challenging and varied work. System rewards can also be characterized as generic 
rewards in the sense that they are potentially available for all organizational 
members contributing positively to knowledge sharing.  
Individual rewards are limited to members of formal or informal 
organizational sub-units such as communities of practices, functional teams or 
formal departments. Individual rewards can be extrinsic such as monetary 
rewards, and intrinsic such as trusting social relations to colleagues. Individual 
rewards can also be denominated as restricted rewards, since they not only 
depend on how well employees contribute to knowledge sharing, but also on 
membership of particular organizational sub-units.  
How, then, do organizational structures yield intrinsic and extrinsic rewards 
and subsequently facilitate knowledge? Knowledge sharing behaviour yielding 
extrinsic rewards is forced by some kind of authority (Lindenberg, 2001), 
whereas intrinsic rewards result from situations not forced by command but 
rather governed by social control mechanisms such as compliance with norms 
and traditions (Homans, 1951; Ouchi, 1980). Extrinsic rewards are therefore 
more likely to be paid in organizational structures assimilating hierarchies, whilst 
intrinsic rewards are yielded in more informal structures such as social networks, 
clans and communities of practices (Adler, 2001; Duguid and Brown, 2001; 
Ouchi, 1980). As Blau and Scott (1962, p. 6), however, has emphasized, in every 
formal organization there are also informal organizations, meaning that intrinsic 
rewards do play a part in the workings of incentives in organizational structures 
such as hierarchies. Conceptualizing how the incentives are at work in knowledge 
sharing, must therefore include dimensions of both extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards, and formal and informal organizational structures.  
But the types of organizational structure facilitating knowledge sharing must 
not solely represent combinations of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, and generic 
and restricted rewards. They must also encompass the three different situations 
of exchange discussed earlier.  
Organizational membership yielding either extrinsic or intrinsic rewards, can 
be conceptualized as an organizational exchange where contributing to 
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knowledge sharing is governed by either authority mechanisms such as rules and 
salary, or more intrinsic rewards such as formal acknowledgement and increased 
efficacy. 
Knowledge sharing based on restricted extrinsic rewards assimilates financial 
exchanges while situations governed by restricted intrinsic rewards are more 
similar to social exchanges. In the table below the four structures encompassing 
the process of knowledge sharing is illustrated, and in the following each of the 
structures will be discussed more thoroughly.  
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
A. Knowledge sharing as an organizational exchange yielding extrinsic 
rewards 
In organizational exchanges yielding extrinsic rewards, there is often a risk of 
social dilemmas since agents through self-interest seeking behaviour or 
opportunism seek to maximize their outcome of – or minimize their effort put 
into - the exchange (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2000; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). 
Close monitoring is therefore a central part of organizational exchanges enabling 
either the punishment or rewarding of knowledge sharing behaviour.  
The main goal of knowledge sharing in organisational exchanges is to bridge 
organizational interdependencies and coordination mechanisms such as rules, 
planning and job descriptions are therefore central elements of knowledge 
sharing (Thompson, 1967). In the words of Ouchi (1980) the intermediary 
between individual and organizational behaviour is rules enforced by authority. 
Situations of knowledge sharing, hence, assimilates the structure of bureaucracies, 
where the costs of contracting and monitoring are at risk outweighing the 
positive consequences of knowledge sharing.  
Nevertheless, knowledge sharing conceptualized as organizational exchanges 
emphasizes what has often been neglected in the literature on knowledge sharing 
– that is, knowledge sharing is not solely about establishing all new social 
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relations that can lead to even more knowledge being shared. Knowledge sharing 
is also about bridging organizational interdependencies thereby becoming even 
more efficient at coordinating and exploiting what is often believed to be 
specialist’s mutual ignorance (Postrel, 2002, p. 305). 
What is being received in return for knowledge, and when it is being received, 
is stipulated by contracts. When entering the organization, individuals will have 
to change their behaviour – they will have to behave in ways that would probably 
not be observed outside the organization (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 296). There 
may be organizational rules forcing employees to document their knowledge or 
to train new employees – in other words, what is being exchanged is knowledge 
in return for salary. 
 
B. Knowledge sharing as an organizational exchange yielding intrinsic 
rewards 
In organizational exchanges yielding intrinsic incentives resources are not used to 
ex-ante settle what is being exchanged. Compared to exchanges yielding extrinsic 
rewards, organizational exchanges yielding intrinsic incentives entail unspecified 
obligations (Blau, 1964, p. 93). This actually frees a lot of resources – resources 
that should otherwise be spent on contracting. On the other hand, unspecified 
obligations must be facilitated by trust between the agents involved in the 
exchange. Trust, hence, substitutes the monitoring and management present in 
the organizational exchange yielding extrinsic rewards and in the financial 
exchange, or – in the words of Adler (2001, p. 219): 
 
Compared to pure authority and price, trust makes possible an enlarged 
scope of knowledge generation and sharing. Trust can dramatically reduce 
both transaction costs – replacing contracts with handshakes – and agency 
risks – replacing the fear of shirking and misrepresentation with mutual 
confidence.  
 
Apparently then, the focus for practices supporting knowledge sharing must 
therefore be re-directed from easy-to-monitor approaches to trust-building 
initiatives (Abrams et al., 2003). But building trust does not come easy, and 
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whether trust-builders eventually succeed in fostering and improving knowledge 
sharing is basically impossible to measure or otherwise assure. Therefore, 
focusing on trust-building as an enhancing device for knowledge sharing requires 
trusting relations between the ones implementing the practices, and the ones 
being subject to the practices.  
 
C. Knowledge sharing as a financial exchange 
A focal point of interest in organizational structures is how easy – or difficult – it 
is to tie individual performance to organizational performance (Katz, 1964; Foss, 
2003, p. 335). If the transparency between individual effort and system 
performance is low, one would expect the motivation for engaging in certain 
activities to decrease, whilst increased transparency on the other hand will 
increase motivation. This reasoning does, however, only relate to what Katz 
(1964, p. 134) refers to as instrumental rewards assuming differential 
performance. If it is not possible to identify individual’s differential performance 
and reward them accordingly, then individual’s contribution to knowledge 
sharing will eventually stop. On the other hand, if it is possible to tie individual 
performance to system performance, then knowledge sharing can be facilitated 
by introducing an organizational structure that assimilates a financial exchange.  
One could argue that organizations are dominated by low-powered incentives 
because it is difficult to directly observe and experience a tie knit between efforts 
and rewards. Organization economists have therefore suggested the internal 
hybrid as a way of introducing market like incentives to the hierarchy. The 
internal hybrid offers a more direct link between effort and reward, and is 
therefore believed to be superior to hierarchies in offering rewards. The internal 
hybrid introduces a market to the formal organization, where knowledge is being 
shared (or allocated) by means of pricing. Organizational subunits – or even 
employees – can put a price on the knowledge they want to share, and the one’s 
who share the most – or the most valuable knowledge – is the one who receive 
the highest extrinsic rewards. Introducing market like incentives to the 
organization allows for increased transparency between individual supply of 
knowledge, and organizational demand for knowledge governed by the pricing of 
knowledge. Organization economist have also termed this kind of structure a 
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high-powered organizational structure emphasizing that the sender of knowledge 
has the freedom to share the knowledge for the highest available price. 
 
D. Knowledge sharing as s social exchange 
A similar logic for the transparency between individual and organizational 
performance is found in more informal systems such as communities of practice. 
The governing mechanism is, however, not the price of knowledge, but the 
informal acknowledgement for sharing knowledge. Traditionally, knowledge 
sharing has been discussed as the process going on in or between hierarchies. 
But, as Miller (1992, p. 19) has emphasized, hierarchies do no always have a 
positive effect on individual autonomy and liberty, and therefore one may expect 
that in hierarchies one runs the risk of crowding out intrinsic motivation. 
Recently, the discussion of knowledge sharing has therefore started to focus on 
what Miles et al. (1997) denominate more cellular organizational forms. These 
organizational forms are more trust-based than authority-based, and are believed 
to more efficiently support knowledge work (Adler 2001). 
When focusing on the social exchange model of knowledge sharing, the span 
of knowledge sharing is reduced to a community – or rather a unit smaller than 
the organization – which allows for an increased transparency as to whom is 
worth trusting. The subunit evolves into a socially regulated entity, which on the 
one hand benefits the trust building process. On the other hand, however, the 
subunit can experience problems in relating to other subunits, and one could 
argue that what happens in the social exchange model of knowledge sharing is, 
that the level of where the problems are – or rather, where there is no willingness 
to share knowledge – shifts from the individual to the group-based level. How to 
avoid this kind of in-growing social relations therefore, also become an important 
part of the practices fostering, supporting and improving knowledge sharing.  
 
 
 
Conclusion – facilitating knowledge sharing 
When viewing how to overcome knowledge sharing barriers as a motivational 
problem, it is important to understand what drives motivation. Motivation differs 
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depending on the culture, organizational setting or social understanding that 
embrace knowledge sharing.  
Conceptualizing knowledge sharing as four different models of exchange 
emphasize that different assumptions and incentives as to why knowledge is 
being shared are at stake. In other words, the culture of willingness to share 
knowledge ranges from willingness enforced by authority mechanisms such as 
rules and rewarded by salary, to social control mechanisms such as reciprocity 
rewarded with trust.  
As has been emphasized by Alvesson (2004, p. 128) a common belief is that 
knowledge work is best facilitated in organic and informal settings such as, for 
instance, communities of practices assimilating social exchanges. Likewise a 
burgeoning amount of literature has recently emphasized non-hierarchical 
organizational structures as superior settings for knowledge creation and sharing.  
Adler (2001, p. 224), for instance, argue that: 
 
A burgeoning body of research shows that when firms need innovation and 
knowledge inputs from suppliers rather than just standardized commodities, 
no combination of strong hierarchical control and market discipline can 
assure as high a level of performance as trust-based community. 
 
And Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997, p. 916) have commented in a similar 
vein that: 
 
To enhance cooperation on shared tasks, the network form of governance 
relies more heavily on social coordination and control, such as occupational 
socialization, collective sanctions, and reputations, than on authority or legal 
resource. 
  
This may lead to the conclusion that social exchanges of knowledge sharing are 
far more important than other model of knowledge exchange. At least, this could 
be argued based on the increasing amount of literature focusing on intrinsic 
rewards based on trust, organizational citizenship behaviour and gift-exchange.  
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The purpose of this article is, however, to emphasize that knowledge sharing 
comprises different models of exchange, characterized by different types of 
reciprocity. Whether one model of exchange is superior to the others, has not 
been part of the discussion. But acknowledging knowledge sharing as different 
models of exchange will enable the assessment of the costs of facilitating 
knowledge sharing.  
In recent years knowledge sharing has been romanticized in the sense that 
there has only been focus on the benefits of facilitating knowledge sharing. What 
has been ignored is the cost of facilitating knowledge sharing, and when recent 
trends in how to facilitate knowledge sharing emphasized trust, trust-building, 
norms and traditions as pivotal, they ignore the potentially significant costs of 
maintaining a knowledge-sharing culture (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983, p. 478). 
I do not argue, that organizational or financial exchanges are superior at 
facilitating knowledge – I simply emphasize that in order to become better at 
understanding why and how to improve knowledge sharing, future research must 
address knowledge sharing as embracing different organizational settings yielding 
benefits but also involving costs.   
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Model of exchange Organizational 
setting 
Intermediary Behavioural 
assumptions 
 
Financial exchange 
Contract, market Price Opportunism 
and self-interest 
seeking 
 
Organizational 
exchange 
 
Bureaucracy Rules Obedience 
 
Social exchange 
Clan, community Trust 
(unspecified 
obligations) 
Organizational 
citizenship 
behaviour 
 
Table I: Three models of exchange (Inspired by Ouchi, 1980, p. 137). 
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Restricted scope of 
rewarding 
 
 
 
C. Financial exchange 
 
 
 
D. Social exchange 
 
Generic scope of 
rewarding 
 
A. Organizational exchange 
yielding extrinsic rewards 
 
 
B. Organizational exchange 
yielding intrinsic rewards 
  
Extrinsic rewards 
 
 
Intrinsic rewards 
 
Table II: Four models of knowledge exchange. 
 
 30
SMG – Working Papers 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
 
2003 
2003-1: Nicolai J. Foss, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova, and Torben Pedersen: 
Governing Knowledge Processes: Theoretical Foundations and Research 
Opportunities. 
2003-2: Yves Doz, Nicolai J. Foss, Stefanie Lenway, Marjorie Lyles, Silvia Massini, 
Thomas P. Murtha and Torben Pedersen: Future Frontiers in International 
Management Research: Innovation, Knowledge Creation, and Change in 
Multinational Companies. 
2003-3: Snejina Michailova and Kate Hutchings: The Impact of In-Groups and Out-
Groups on Knowledge Sharing in Russia and China CKG Working Paper. 
2003-4: Nicolai J. Foss and Torben Pedersen : The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: The 
Roles of Knowledge Sources and Organizational Instruments in MNC Knowledge 
Management CKG Working Paper. 
2003-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss and Xosé H. Vázquez-Vicente: “Tying the Manager’s 
Hands”: How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic 
Managerial Intervention Less Likely CKG Working Paper. 
2003-6: Marjorie Lyles, Torben Pedersen and Bent Petersen: Knowledge Gaps: The Case 
of Knowledge about Foreign Entry. 
2003-7: Kirsten Foss and Nicolai J. Foss: The Limits to Designed Orders: Authority under 
“Distributed Knowledge” CKG Working Paper. 
2003-8: Jens Gammelgaard and Torben Pedersen: Internal versus External Knowledge 
Sourcing of Subsidiaries - An Organizational Trade-Off. 
2003-9: Kate Hutchings and Snejina Michailova: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing in 
Russian and Chinese Subsidiaries: The Importance of Groups and Personal 
Networks Accepted for publication in Journal of Knowledge Management. 
2003-10: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen and Markus Verzin: The impact of knowledge 
management on MNC subsidiary performance: the role of absorptive capacity 
CKG Working Paper. 
2003-11: Tomas Hellström and Kenneth Husted: Mapping Knowledge and Intellectual 
Capital in Academic Environments: A Focus Group Study Accepted for 
publication in Journal of Intellectual Capital  CKG Working Paper.  
2003-12: Nicolai J Foss: Cognition and Motivation in the Theory of the Firm: Interaction or 
“Never the Twain Shall Meet”? Accepted for publication in Journal des Economistes 
et des Etudes Humaines CKG Working Paper.  
2003-13: Dana Minbaeva and Snejina Michailova: Knowledge transfer and expatriation 
practices in MNCs: The role of disseminative capacity.  
2003-14: Christian Vintergaard and Kenneth Husted: Enhancing selective capacity through 
venture bases.  
2004 
2004-1: Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge and Organization in the Theory of the Multinational 
Corporation: Some Foundational Issues 
2004-2: Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM practices and MNC knowledge transfer  
2004-3: Bo Bernhard Nielsen and Snejina Michailova: Toward a phase-model of global 
knowledge management systems in multinational corporations
2004-4: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J Foss: The Next Step in the Evolution of the RBV: 
Integration with Transaction Cost Economics
2004-5: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Methodological Individualism and the 
Organizational Capabilities Approach
2004-6: Jens Gammelgaard, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova: Knowledge-sharing 
Behavior and Post-acquisition Integration Failure
2004-7: Jens Gammelgaard: Multinational Exploration of Acquired R&D Activities 
2004-8: Christoph Dörrenbächer & Jens Gammelgaard: Subsidiary Upgrading? Strategic 
Inertia in the Development of German-owned Subsidiaries in Hungary 
2004-9: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Resources and Transaction Costs: How the 
Economics of Property Rights Furthers the Resource-based View 
2004-10: Jens Gammelgaard & Thomas Ritter: The Knowledge Retrieval Matrix: 
Codification and Personification as Separate Strategies 
2004-11: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of 
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade? 
2004-12: Akshey Gupta & Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Sharing in Knowledge-Intensive 
Firms: Opportunities and Limitations of Knowledge Codification 
2004-13: Snejina Michailova & Kate Hutchings: Knowledge Sharing and National Culture: 
A Comparison Between China and Russia 
2005 
2005-1: Keld Laursen & Ammon Salter: My Precious - The Role of Appropriability 
Strategies in Shaping Innovative Performance 
2005-2: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A 
Stocktaking and Assessment 
2005-3: Lars Bo Jeppesen & Lars Frederiksen: Why Firm-Established User Communities 
Work for Innovation: The Personal Attributes of Innovative Users in the Case of 
Computer-Controlled Music  
2005-4: Dana B. Minbaeva: Negative Impact of Hrm Complementarity on Knowledge 
Transfer in Mncs 
2005-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Sandra K. Klein: Austrian Capital 
Theory and the Link Between Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
2005-1: Nicolai J. Foss: The Knowledge Governance Approach 
2005-2: Torben J. Andersen: Capital Structure, Environmental Dynamism, Innovation 
Strategy, and Strategic Risk Management 
2005-3: Torben J. Andersen: A Strategic Risk Management Framework for Multinational 
Enterprise 
2005-4: Peter Holdt Christensen: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing: A Conceptual 
Framework 
 
